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We define instantiational and algorithmic completeness for a formal language. 
We show that, in the presence of Church’s Thesis, an alternative interpretation 
of Gödelian incompleteness is that Peano Arithmetic is instantiationally 
complete, but algorithmically incomplete. We then postulate a Provability 
Thesis that links Peano Arithmetic and effective algorithmic computability, 
just as Church's Thesis links Recursive Arithmetic and effective 
instantiational computability. 
1. Introduction: Interpreting universal quantification 
An issue that, sooner or later, seems to obfuscate every philosophical discussion on the 
relationship between formal logic and computability, and one which seems to lie also at 
the root of most foundational ambiguities, is the equivocal, semantic, interpretation of 
universal quantification (i.e., of unqualified generalisation).  
In other words, standard interpretations of classical theory do not provide an 
unambiguous answer to the question: 
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Can we unequivocally interpret a universally quantified formula of a language L 
under an interpretation M? 
2. Differentiating instantational and algorithmic Tarskian satisfiability 
We begin by noting that Tarski's definitions of the satisfiability and truth of the formulas 
of a formal language, say L, under an interpretation, say M, can be qualified to 
differentiate between at least two, essentially different, methods of assigning, for 
instance, the valuation TRUE to a predicate of M, by appeal to definitions such as the 
following2: 
(i) Effective instantiational satisfiability: A predicate, say R(x), of an interpretation 
M, of a language L, is effectively satisfiable instantiationally if, and only if, given any 
element s in the domain D of the interpretation M, there is some effective3 method, 
say T(s), of determining that R(s) is satisfied under the interpretation M; 
(ii) Effective algorithmic satisfiability: A predicate, say R(x), of an interpretation 
M, of a language L, is effectively satisfiable algorithmically if, and only if, there is 
some effective method, say UT, such that, given any element s in the domain D of the 
interpretation M, UT effectively determines that R(s) is satisfied under the 
interpretation M. 
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Now, if R(x) is the interpretation in M of an L-formula, [R(x)]4, then (i) is satisfied if, for 
every s in D, [R(s)] is provable5 in L, and L is assumed to be sound6. Similarly, (ii) is 
satisfied if [(Ax)R(x)] is provable in such an L. 
Further, although every algorithmically satisfiable predicate of M is instantiationally 
satisfiable in M, Gödel has shown ([Go31a], p25(1)7) - by a constructive and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable meta-argument - that there are instances when [R(x)] is 
instantiationally provable8 if L is a consistent Peano Arithmetic, so (i) holds; but 
[(Ax)R(x)] is not provable in L, so (ii) may not hold.  
It follows that (i) and (ii) cannot be assumed equivalent without qualification. 
3. Differentiating instantiational and algorithmic Tarskian truth 
This suggests that, if we treat (i) as corresponding to the classical definition of Tarskian 
truth in M, which we may denote symbolically by |=M [(Ax)R(x)], then we can treat (ii) 
as the definition of a qualified, algorithmic, Tarskian truth in M - which we may denote 
symbolically by ||=M [(Ax)R(x)]. 
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So we can, without loss of generality, symbolically express the distinction between 
instantiational Tarskian truth, and algorithmic Tarskian truth, by defining: 
(1) |=M [(Ax)R(x)] <=> (i); 
and: 
 (2) ||=M [(Ax)R(x)] <=> (ii); 
where: 
(3) ||=M [(Ax)R(x)] => |=M [(Ax)R(x)]; 
but the following does not always hold: 
(4) |=M [(Ax)R(x)] => ||=M [(Ax)R(x)]. 
4. Defining instantiational and algorithmic provability 
We can, then, define: 
(iii) Instantiational provability: An instantiationally Tarskian-true predicate, R(…)9, 
of an interpretation, say M, of a formal language, say L, is instantiationally provable 
in L if, and only if, R(…) is the interpretation of an L-formula, [R(…)], and every 
instantiation of R(…) in M is the interpretation of an L-provable formula. 
(iv) Algorithmic provability: An algorithmically Tarskian-true predicate, R(…), of 
an interpretation, say M, of a formal language, say L, is algorithmically provable in L 
if, and only if, R(…) is the interpretation of an L-formula, [R(…)], and [(A…)R(…)] 
is provable in L. 
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5. Defining instantiational and algorithmic completeness 
We can also define, further: 
Instantiational completeness: A language L is instantiationally complete with 
respect to an interpretation M if, and only if, every instantiationally Tarskian-true 
predicate, R(…), of M is instantiationally equivalent to a predicate, R'(…), of M, 
every instantiation of which is the interpretation in M of an L-provable formula. 
Algorithmic completeness: A language L is algorithmically complete with respect to 
an interpretation M if, and only if, every algorithmically Tarskian-true predicate, 
R(…), of M is provable in L. 
We now show the significance of the above definitions, by considering the particular case 
where L is a consistent first-order Peano Arithmetic, and M its standard interpretation. 
6. Differentiating between instantiational and algorithmic effective 
computability 
Now, a standard expression of Church’s Thesis is: 
Church’s Thesis: A (partial) number-theoretic function is effectively computable if, 
and only if, it is (partial) recursive. 
If we, again, differentiate between instantiational and algorithmic computability, we can 
interpret the above as asserting that: 
 Instantiational Church’s Thesis: A (partial) number-theoretic function (or relation, 
treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable instantiationally if, and only 
if, it is instantiationally equivalent to a (partial) recursive function (or relation, treated 
as a Boolean function). 
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and: 
Algorithmic Church’s Thesis: A (partial) number-theoretic function (or relation, 
treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable algorithmically if, and only 
if, it is (partial) recursive. 
7. Is first-order Peano Arithmetic instantiationally complete with 
respect to its standard interpretation? 
Now, by the Instantiational Church’s Thesis, every instantiationally Tarskian-true 
predicate, R(…), of M is instantiationally equivalent to a recursive relation, R'(…), of M 
that, treated as a Boolean function, always evaluates as TRUE. 
By Gödel’s Theorems V and VII [Go31a]10, it follows that there is, thus, a PA-formula, 
[R''(…)], such that its standard interpretation in M, the arithmetical relation R''(…), is 
instantiationally equivalent, in M, to R'(…), and, hence, to R(…); and every instantiation 
of R''(…) in M is the standard interpretation of a PA-provable formula. 
It follows that: 
Meta-theorem 1: Church’s Thesis implies that first-order Peano Arithmetic is 
instantiationally complete with respect to its standard interpretation. 
Thus, Church’s Thesis is the meta-postulate that provides the arithmetic consequences, in 
first-order Peano Arithmetic, which are intended by the second-order Induction Axiom of 
Peano’s Postulates ([Me64], p102). 
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The Thesis, essentially, postulates that any arbitrary property that holds instantionally 
under the standard interpretation of Peano’s second-order Induction Axiom is 
instantiationally equivalent to a recursive relation in the interpretation. 
It follows that: 
Corollary 1.1: Church’s Thesis implies that first-order Peano Arithmetic formalizes 
Dedekind’s Peano Postulates completely with respect to Tarskian truth. 
The question arises: How do we interpret Gödelian incompleteness in the presence of 
Church’s Thesis? 
8. Is Peano Arithmetic algorithmically complete with respect to its 
standard interpretation? 
Now, Peano Arithmetic would, further, be algorithmically complete with respect to its 
standard interpretation, M, if, and only if, every algorithmically Tarskian-true predicate, 
R(…), of M were provable in PA. 
In the Appendix we show, however, that this is not the case, since Gödel’s Tarskian-true 
primitive recursive predicate, ~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))11 - which is algorithmic by definition -  
is not the standard interpretation of any of its representations in Gödel’s formal system P 
(and the argument remains valid for any first-order Peano Arithmetic). 
We thus have: 
Meta-theorem 2: First-order Peano Arithmetic is not algorithmically complete with 
respect to its standard interpretation, M. 
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So, in the presence of Church’s Thesis, the Gödelian incompleteness of a Peano 
Arithmetic is, essentially, the assertion that the Arithmetic is not algorithmically 
complete with respect to its standard interpretation, M. 
9. Is Peano Arithmetic algorithmically complete with respect to the 
Arithmetical part of M? 
We define: 
Arithmetic completeness: An Arithmetic, A, is arithmetically complete with respect 
to its standard interpretation, M, if, and only if, every algorithmically Tarskian-true 
arithmetical predicate, R(…), of M is provable in A. 
The question arises: Is PA arithmetically complete? 
Now, it seems reasonable, and intuitively unobjectionable, to assume that, if there is an 
algorithm such that every instantiation of an arithmetical predicate, R(…), is effectively 
decidable as Tarskian-true in M, then there must be a corresponding PA-proof sequence 
for the formula, [R(…)]. 
We may formally define this assertion as a: 
Provability Thesis: Every algorithmically Tarskian-true arithmetical predicate, 
R(…), is provable in PA. 
It follows that: 
Meta-theorem 3: The Provability Thesis implies that first-order Peano Arithmetic is 
arithmetically complete with respect to its standard interpretation, M. 
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10. Is the Provability Thesis effectively verifiable? 
The question arises: Is the Provability Thesis effectively verifiable? 
Now, if it were always effectively decidable in M whether or not an arbitrary number-
theoretic relation is algorithmically Tarskian-true - i.e., it is effectively satisfied 
algorithmically in the sense of (ii) - then, assuming Church’s Thesis, it would follow that 
Turing’s Halting Problem would be decidable by a Turing machine.  
Since this is not the case, it follows that the Provability Thesis, like Church’s Thesis, may 
not be effectively verifiable. 
11. Soundness 
Now, standard interpretations of classical logic define the following semantic meta-
implication as an instance of the property of the ‘soundness’ of PA: 
(5) |-PA [(Ax)R(x)] => |=M [(Ax)R(x)]. 
Further, standard interpretations of classical theory show that the converse meta-
implication, |=M [(Ax)R(x)] => |-PA [(Ax)R(x)], does not necessarily hold - a consequence 
of Tarski's Theorem that arithmetical truth cannot be defined arithmetically. 
The Provability Thesis is, thus, an attempt to offer a possible answer to the question: Can, 
and if so, when, does the converse hold? 
It is the postulation that, if R(x) is an arithmetical predicate, then, in the sense of (2): 
(6) ||=M [(Ax)R(x)] => |-PA [(Ax)R(x)] 
 The detailed consequences of such a postulation are beyond the immediate intent, and 
scope, of the subject of this essay.  
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12. Some consequences of postulating a Provability Thesis for PA 
However, we note, briefly, that, if we postulate a Provability Thesis for Peano 
Arithmetic, then: 
(a) we would interpret Gödel’s reasoning as showing that, whereas (ii) implies (i), the 
converse does not always hold; 
(b) Peano Arithmetic would be ω-inconsistent12 - and, so, Gödel’s Theorem VI 
[Go31a], and its consequences, would hold vacuously13;  
According to the Provability Thesis, there is no algorithm for determining 
that, given any natural number n in the standard interpretation M of PA, R(n) 
holds in M, although R(n) is true in M for every natural number n, and [R(n)] 
is provable in PA for every numeral [n]. 
Since mere addition of [(Ax)R(x)] as an axiom to PA would not entail the 
introduction of an algorithm in M for determining that, given any natural 
number n, R(n) holds in M, it follows that PA+[(Ax)R(x)] would be 
inconsistent under the standard interpretation. 
It follows that, if PA is consistent, then [(Ax)R(x)] would not be independent 
of the axioms of PA. Hence, [~(Ax)R(x)] would be PA-provable14.  
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Since [R(x)] is provable in PA whenever we substitute any numeral [n] for the 
variable [x], it would then follow that PA would be consistent, but not ω-
consistent. 
(c) the intuitionist objection, to concluding that the provability of [(Ex)R'(x)] in PA 
always implies the existence of some s, in M, such that R'(s) holds in M, would 
be vindicated if PA is ω-consistent; and Rosser’s proof of undecidability would 
fail.  
Since [(Ex)R'(x)] is simply an abbreviation of [~(Ax)~R'(x)], under the 
Provability Thesis, the PA provability of [~(Ax)~R'(x)] is the meta-assertion 
that there is no algorithm in M for determining that, given any natural number 
n, ~R'(n) holds in M.  
However, if PA is ω-consistent, we may have that [~(Ax)~R'(x)] is PA-
provable, and also that [~R(x)] is provable in PA whenever we substitute any 
numeral [n] for the variable [x]. 
Hence we may not conclude from the PA provability of [~(Ax)~R'(x)] that 
there is always some s, in M, such that R'(s) holds in M. 
Now Rosser’s proof - that that his proposition, say [(Ax)R*(x)], can be shown 
to be undecidable in PA without assuming ω-consistency - assumes that, from 
the premise [~(Ax)R*(x)] in PA, we may conclude the existence of some 
natural number s in M such that ~R*(s) holds in M. However, under the 
Provability Thesis, such an assumption may be invalid. 
(d) the Turing Thesis would no longer hold, since, if [(Ax)G(x)] represents Gödel’s 
undecidable proposition, then the arithmetical predicate G(n), treated as a 
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Boolean function, would be an instantiationally (assumed effectively) computable 
function that would not, however, be Turing-computable;  
(e) consequently, G(n) would be in the complexity class NP, but not in P; 
(f) Hilbert's proposed ω-rule could, then, be viewed as also an attempt at a complete, 
semantic, definition of provability for Peano Arithmetic. 
13. Significance of a Provability Thesis 
Now, the Provability Thesis, is, essentially, the assertion that a PA formula is provable if, 
and only if, any one of its interpretations is Tarskian-decidable algorithmically, in the 
sense of (ii) above.  
The significance of such a link between formal provability and computability emerges 
when it is seen in a broader perspective, where we note that:  
(a) Church's Thesis, in its instantiational, weakened, form, (i.e., as an equivalence 
which is implied by the standard form of Church's Thesis, although the converse does 
not hold) builds an iff bridge between instantiational (assumed effective) 
computability and Recursive Arithmetic; 
eg., A number-theoretic predicate R(x), is instantiationally (assumed effectively) 
decidable for every natural number value of x if, and only if, R(x) is 
instantiationally (assumed effectively) equivalent to a recursive predicate Q(x).  
(b) Hilbert & Bernays Representation Theorem, and its converse, together, build an 
iff bridge between Recursive Arithmetic and Peano Arithmetic; 
eg., A number-theoretic predicate Q(x) is recursive if, and only if, Q(x) is 
representable in PA when treated as a Boolean function.  
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(c) The Church-Turing Theorem builds an iff bridge between Recursive Arithmetic 
and Turing computability; 
eg., A number-theoretic predicate Q(x) is recursive if, and only if, Q(x), treated as 
a Boolean function, is total and Turing-computable.  
(d) Markov algorithms build an iff bridge between Turing computability and 
algorithmic computability. 
eg., A number-theoretic predicate Q(x), treated as a Boolean function, is Turing-
computable if, and only if, Q(x), treated as a Boolean function, is partially 
Markov-computable. 
However: 
(e) Soundness merely builds an only-if bridge between Peano Arithmetic and Turing 
(algorithmic) computability; 
eg., [R(x)] is a PA-provable formula only if, under the standard interpretation of 
PA, the interpreted arithmetical predicate, R(n), treated as a Boolean function, is 
Turing-computable as TRUE for any given natural number n. 
whilst: 
(f) The Provability Thesis complements, and completes, the concept of Soundness in 
arithmetic by building an iff bridge between Peano Arithmetic and Turing 
(algorithmic) computability. 
eg., [R(x)] is a PA-provable formula if, and only if, under the standard 
interpretation of PA, the interpreted arithmetical predicate, R(n), treated as a 
Boolean function, is Turing-computable as TRUE for any given natural number n. 
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14. Conclusion  
We have shown that Church’s Thesis implies that a first-order Peano Arithmetic is 
instantiationally complete, in the sense that it completely formalizes Dedekind’s Peano 
Postulates with respect to Tarskian-truth. 
We have shown, further, that, in the presence of Church’s Thesis, the Gödelian 
incompleteness of a Peano Arithmetic is, essentially, the assertion that the Arithmetic is 
not algorithmically complete with respect to its standard interpretation, M. 
We have, then, defined a Provability Thesis that complements, and completes, the 
concept of Soundness in arithmetic by building an iff bridge between Peano Arithmetic 
and Turing (algorithmic) computability.  
We have also briefly indicated how the consequences of such a Thesis - whose detailed 
consideration lies beyond the intent and scope of the present investigation - may be 
significant for standard interpretations of classical theory. 
Appendix 
Notation 
Unless specified otherwise, we generally follow the notation introduced by Mendelson in 
his English translation of Gödel’s 1931 paper [Go31a]; however, for convenience of 
exposition, we refer to it as Gödel’s notation. Two notable exceptions: we use the 
notation “(Ax)”, whose classical, standard, interpretation is “for all x”, to denote Gödel’s 
special symbol for Generalisation; the successor symbol is denoted by “S”, instead of by 
“f”. 
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Following Gödel (cf. [Go31a], footnote 13), we use square brackets to indicate that the 
expression [(Ax)], including square brackets, only denotes the uninterpreted string15 
named16 within the brackets. Thus, [(Ax)] is not part of the formal system P, and would 
be replaced by Gödel’s special symbolism for Generalisation wherever it occurs. 
Following Gödel’s definitions of well-formed formulas17, we note that juxtaposing the 
string [(Ax)] and the formula18 [F(x)] is the formula [(Ax)F(x)], juxtaposing the symbol 
[~] and the formula [F] is the formula [~F], and juxtaposing the symbol [v] between the 
formulas [F] and [G] is the formula [FvG]. 
The number-theoretic functions and relations in the following are defined explicitly by 
Gödel [Go31a]. The formulas are defined implicitly by his reasoning. 
Preliminary Definitions 
We take P to be Gödel’s formal system19, and define ([Go31a], Theorem VI, p24-25): 
(i) Q(x, y) as Gödel’s recursive relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))20. 
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 We define a “string” as any concatenation of a finite set of the primitive symbols of the formal system 
under consideration. 
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 We note that the “name” inside the square brackets only serves as an abbreviation for some string in P. 
 
17
 We note that all well-formed formulas of P are strings of P, but all strings of P are not well-formed 
formulas of P. 
 
18
 By “formula”, we mean a “well-formed formula” as defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p11). 
 
19
 Gödel ([Go31a], p9-13). 
 
20
 We follow Gödel’s definition of recursive number-theoretic functions and relations ([Go31a], p14-17). 
We note, in particular, that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic function Sb(x 19|Z(y)) is defined as the 
Gödel-number of the P-formula that is obtained from the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x by 
substituting the numeral [y], whose Gödel-number is Z(y), for the variable whose Gödel-number is 19 
wherever the latter occurs free in the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x ([Go31a], p20, def.31). We also 
note that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic relation xBy holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a 
proof sequence for the P-formula whose Gödel-number is y ([Go31a], p22, def. 45). 
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(ii) [R(x, y)] as a formula that represents Q(x, y) in the formal system P. 
(iii) q as the Gödel-number21 of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. 
(iv) p as the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, y)]22 of P. 
(v) [p] as the numeral that represents the natural number p in P. 
(vi) r as the Gödel-number of the formula [R(x, p)] of P. 
(vii) 17Genr as the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, p)] of P. 
(viii) Neg(17Genr)23 as the Gödel-number of the formula [~(Ax)R(x, p)] of P. 
(ix) R(x, y) as the standard interpretation of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. 
Meta-theorem 224: There is a recursive relation that is not the standard representation of 
any of its representations in P.  
Proof: We consider Gödel’s primitive recursive relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))). 
(a) We assume that every recursive number-theoretic function or relation is the 
standard interpretation of at least one of its formal representations in P25. 
                                                 
21
 By the “Gödel-number” of a formula of P, we mean the natural number corresponding to the formula in 
the 1-1 correspondence defined by Gödel ([Go31a], p13). 
 
22
 We note that “[(Ax)][R(x, y)]” and “[(Ax)R(x, y)]” denote the same formula of P. 
 
23
 We note that Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic function Neg(x) is the Gödel-number of the P-formula 
that is the negation of the P-formula whose Gödel-number is x ([Go31a], p18, def. 13). 
 
24
 Meta-theorem 2 is, essentially, the meta-thesis that, if we assume the primitive recursive relation 
~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))) to be an abbreviation of some formula of P, then we arrive at an inconsistency in P. 
 
25
 In other words, we assume that, if we use Gödel’s recursive definitions ([Go31a], p17-20), and follow the 
reasoning he outlines in Theorem V ([Go31a], p23), we can transform the relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))) into 
a form such that all the symbols that occur in it are standard interpretations of primitive symbols of P. See 
also Gödel’s remarks ([Go31a], p11, footnote 22) in this context. 
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(b)  There is, thus, some P-formula [~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))] whose standard interpretation 
is the primitive recursive relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))26. 
(c) Now, in every model M27 (cf. [Me64], p192-3) of P, we can also interpret28: 
(i) the integer 0 as the interpretation of the symbol “0”; 
(ii) the successor operation as the interpretation of the successor function “'”; 
(iii) addition and multiplication as the interpretations of “+” and “.”; 
(iv) the interpretation of the predicate letter = as the identity relation. 
(d) Since the numerals of P interpret as a sub-domain of every model M of P, the 
natural numbers are, then, a sub-domain of every M.  
(e) Further, by the hypothesis (a), all of Gödel’s 45 primitive recursive functions and 
relations ([Go31a], p17-22) are also, then, mirrored in every model M of P, and the 
P-formula, [~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))], always interprets as the M-relation ~xB(Sb(p 
19|Z(p))), where [p] is the numeral that represents the natural number p in P, and p 
is the Gödel-number of [(Ax)~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y)))]. 
(f) Hence, in every model M of P, the relation ~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) holds in M if, and 
only if, x is a M-number that is not the Gödel-number of a proof of [(Ax)~xB(Sb(p 
19|Z(p)))] in P. 
                                                 
26
 Since, by the hypothesis (a), every recursive number-theoretic function and relation is “mirrored” in P. 
 
27
 We follow Mendelson’s definition of a model ([Me64], p51): An interpretation is said to be a model for a 
set T of well-formed formulas of P if, and only if, every well-formed formula in T is true for the 
interpretation. 
 
28
 Cf. Mendelson ([Me64], p107). 
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(g) Further, since the Gödel-number of a proof of [(Ax)~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] in P is 
necessarily a natural number, ~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) holds in every model M of P if x 
is an M-number that is not a natural number.  
(h) Now, Gödel has shown (cf. [Go31a], Theorem VI) that ~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) holds 
over the domain of the natural numbers.  
(i) It follows that ~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p))) is satisfied by all x in every model M of P.  
(j) Hence, the P-formula [(Ax)~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] is true (cf. [Me64], p51) in every 
model M of P, and, by Gödel’s Completeness Theorem ([Me64], Corollary 2.14, 
p68), [(Ax)~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] is P-provable. 
However, since Gödel has shown that [(Ax)~xB(Sb(p 19|Z(p)))] is not P-provable (cf. 
[Go31a], Theorem VI), we conclude that assumption (a) does not hold. This proves the 
theorem. 
References  
[Go31a] Gödel, Kurt. 1931. On formally undecidable propositions of Principia 
Mathematica and related systems I. Translated by Elliott Mendelson. In M. 
Davis (ed.). 1965. The Undecidable. Raven Press, New York. 
[Me64] Mendelson, Elliott. 1964. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Van Norstrand, 
Princeton.  
 
(Created: Saturday, 2nd July 2005, 8:16:55 PM IST. Updated Monday, 4th July 2005, 
12:44:06 AM IST, by re@alixcomsi.com.)  
